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ABSTRAK 
 
Sekoci adalah salah satu peralatan yang menyelamatkan jiwa 
yang paling penting onboard kapal, yang digunakan pada saat 
darurat ekstrim untuk meninggalkan kapal. Sekoci adalah 
kapal kecil yang kaku, dijamin onboard, ke davits sehingga 
dapat diluncurkan ke sisi kapal dengan sedikit waktu dan 
bantuan mekanik mungkin untuk melarikan diri awal kru dari 
kapal. Dalam dekade sejak itu menjadi persyaratan bahwa 
peralatan menyelamatkan nyawa tersedia untuk semua orang 
di kapal, banyak fitur desain sekoci dan sistem peluncuran 
mereka telah berubah. Ini biasanya telah dalam menanggapi 
tuntutan untuk kapasitas yang lebih besar sekoci, 
perlindungan yang lebih besar bagi mereka yang 
menggunakan mereka, kemudahan pengoperasian dan 
keselamatan ditingkatkan. Sebuah sekoci harus membawa 
semua peralatan yang diuraikan di bawah kode SOLAS dan 
LSA, yang lulus untuk kelangsungan hidup di laut. Ini 
termasuk jatah, air tawar, pertolongan pertama, kompas, 
distress peralatan sinyal seperti roket dll Sebuah kapal harus 
membawa satu perahu penyelamat untuk tujuan 
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penyelamatan, bersama dengan sekoci lainnya. Salah satu 
sekoci dapat ditunjuk sebagai perahu penyelamat, jika lebih 
dari dua atau lebih sekoci yang hadir onboard kapal a. sekoci 
adalah kerajinan air yang digunakan untuk membantu 
penumpang di perahu dan kapal dalam kesulitan. Ini adalah 
kerajinan kecil di atas kapal laut untuk memungkinkan 
melarikan diri darurat. Sebuah sekoci adalah jenis kapal yang 
digunakan untuk melarikan diri struktur tenggelamnya lebih 
besar seperti kapal pesiar, kapal komersial, atau pesawat yang 
telah mendarat di air. Sebuah sekoci adalah perahu kecil, kaku 
atau tiup dilakukan untuk evakuasi darurat dalam hal terjadi 
bencana di kapal. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memperoleh 
risiko yang dapat dihasilkan dari Lifeboat selama peluncuran 
dan operasi pemulihan menggunakan metode FMEA dan 
mendapatkan tingkat prioritas risiko siapa risiko yang dapat 
diterima, risiko ditolerir atau berisiko tinggi. Lalu bagaimana 
untuk meminimalkan kategori risiko tinggi untuk mencegah 
kecelakaan menggunakan Lopa. Menggunakan Mode 
Kegagalan dan Efek Metode Analisis (FMEA) untuk 
penilaian risiko. 
Kata kunci : Analisa risiko, FMEA, LOPA, peluncuran 
Free fall lifeboat, prioritas risiko. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Lifeboat is one of the most important life-saving equipment 
onboard a ship, which is used at the time of extreme 
emergencies for abandoning a ship. Lifeboat is a smaller rigid 
vessel, secured onboard into davits so that it can be launched 
over the side of the ship with least time and mechanical 
assistance possible for an early escape of the crew from the 
ship. In the decades since it became a requirement that 
lifesaving appliances are available for everyone on board a 
vessel, many design features of lifeboats and their launching 
systems have changed. These have usually been in response to 
the demands for larger lifeboat capacity, greater protection for 
those using them, ease of operation and enhanced safety. A 
lifeboat must carry all the equipment described under SOLAS 
and LSA codes, which are passed for the survival at sea. This 
includes rations, fresh water, first aid, compass, distress 
signaling equipment like rocket etc. A ship must carry one 
rescue boat for the rescuing purpose, along with other 
lifeboats. One of the lifeboats can be designated as a rescue 
boat, if more than two or more lifeboats are present onboard a 
ship. The lifeboat is a water craft used to help passengers on 
boats and ships in trouble. It is a small craft aboard a ship to 
allow for emergency escape. A lifeboat is a kind of boat that 
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is used to escape a larger sinking structure such as a cruise 
ship, commercial vessel, or aircraft that has landed in the 
water. A lifeboat is a small, rigid or inflatable watercraft 
carried for emergency evacuation in the event of a disaster 
aboard ship.  
 
Keywords : FMEA, Free fall lifeboat launching, risk 
assessment, , risk priority, LOPA. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, an incredible 
improvement in safety at sea has taken place. Much of the 
improvement has to do with technical and operational 
improvements in ship and offshore technology and 
equipment, with the aim to avoid dangerous situations or limit 
the damage when a situation has occurred. Watertight 
bulkheads, fireproof materials, separated engine rooms etc. 
have been designed and developed to do just this; to prevent 
escalation of a dangerous situation.  
Other systems aim to resolve dangerous situations or 
limit the damage by use of systems on board, such as 
firefighting systems, bilge pumps etc. However, in severe 
emergencies, these systems may not be sufficient to resolve 
the situation.  
The initial incident, such as an explosion or a ship-to-
ship collision, may escalate to a situation where it is no longer 
safe for the crew to stay on board the ship or installation. The 
only option is then to abandon ship, i.e. for the crew to leave 
the ship or installation and find a safe refuge in a lifeboat, 
another ship, offshore structure or on land. When the decision 
to abandon ship has been made, the crew members have to 
rely on the lifesaving equipment, which can consist of several 
different components.  
This thesis will discuss the Risk Assessment on a Free-
Fall Lifeboat with the purpose of determining whether an 
Free-Fall Lifeboat have a risk that is acceptable or not, create 
awareness about the dangers and risks obtained from the Free-
Fall Lifeboat. It aims to reduce the possibility of danger by 
adding steps - necessary control measures and precautions. 
The assessment also prioritize hazards and help determine 
whether the existing control measures are adequate. A risk 
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assessment carried out by the “FMEA (Failure Modes and 
Effect Annalysis)” method 
 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
Launching and retrieving a lifeboat are high-risk 
activities, but with proper training a ship’s personnel can 
attain the required level of familiarity to identify and 
overcome the potential risks. The MAIB (Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch) database accumulated over a ten-year 
period indicates that lifeboats and their launching systems 
have cost the lives of 12 professional seafarers, or 16% of the 
total lives lost on merchant ships. Eighty seven people have 
been injured. These accidents all occurred during training 
exercises or testing, with experienced and qualified seafarers 
either performing, or supervising, the operations. Based on the 
description above, presented several problems: 
1. What are the risks and failures that can be generated 
on free-fall lifeboat? 
2. How is the level of each step of process launching? 
3. How to minimize risk and failure on free fall lifeboat 
launching?  
 
1.3 Research Limitation  
1. The analysis focuses only on the safety equipment 
aboard the lifeboat. 
2. The method used to interpret the risk is FMEA 
(Failure Modes and Effect Annalysis) method. 
3. Type of Lifeboat that free-fall Lifeboat 
1.4 Objective 
The objectives of this Thesis are: 
1. Knowing the risks and failures that can be generated 
on a free-fall Lifeboat 
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2. Knowing the level of danger that can be generated 
from each step of launching and recovery process. 
3. To obtain a way to eliminate the risk and failure. 
1.5 Benefit 
The final results of this Thesis is the form of safety 
recommendations for functional of an free-fall Lifeboat 
Launching to prevent and minimize accident. 
 
1.6 Writing Structure 
This thesis contains an introduction, literature review, 
methodology, analysis and discussion and conclusion with the 
following stages : 
a. CHAPTER I (INTRODUCTION), contains the 
background, problem formulation, problem definition, 
research objectives, the benefits of research, and 
systematic writing. 
b. CHAPTER II (LITERATURE REVIEW), contains 
introduction of lifeboat, launching process, risk 
analysis and FMEA method 
c. CHAPTER III (METHODOLOGY), describes the 
methods used to solve the existing problems in this 
thesis. 
d. CHAPTER IV (DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS), 
discusses the risk analysis using FMEA method. 
e. CHAPTER V (CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS), contains the conclusions 
and recommendations of the analysis results to refine 
the results of this thesis and related issues. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this literature review section will describe the basic 
theory , such as risk assessment method, Free Fall lifeboat, 
FMEA worksheet, LOPA.  that will support and build a base 
for conducting this research.  
 
2.1  Evacuation 
In the maritime industry, as in all other industries, 
various degrees of undesired events occur from time to time. 
Although much effort is put into avoiding situations which 
can be harmful to human health, the possibility of an 
emergency is always present. On petroleum installations, such 
as drilling rigs, drill ships, oil production platforms, etc., the 
presence of explosive and combustible substances increases 
the potential risk of fires and explosions. When a situation 
arises which is dangerous for the crew, the solution is often to 
move the entire crew to a safer location. This operation 
involves three phases : 
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Figure 2.1 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue 
Phase one is the evacuation phase, which consists of 
movement from one part of the installation to another. The 
crew moves to a lifeboat mustering station or a helicopter 
deck, where they board a lifeboat or a helicopter. The goal is 
to prepare for the next phase, which is evacuation.  
 
Phase two is the evacuation phase. The goal of this phase is to 
move the crew away from immediate danger. Before the 
operation enters this phase, the situation has escalated to a 
level where it is no longer safe for the crew to stay on the 
installation. They must therefore be evacuated to location 
where they can stay in relative safety until they can be rescued 
to a more permanent refuge. The evacuation can be carried 
out by helicopter or by lifeboats. As helicopters are in daily 
use for transportation in the oil industry, they are preferred 
also for evacuation.  
 
The operation can be performed as an ordinary transport 
operation, with a high degree of routine and a very low risk. 
The crew can be moved dry-shoed at a very high speed to 
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another installation. However, due to the limited capacity of 
each helicopter, this type of evacuation is time consuming. It 
is also subject to weather limitations. Lifeboat evacuation is 
therefore preferred when time is of the essence and when the 
weather conditions do not allow helicopter evacuation. The 
lifeboat evacuates the crew from the installation to a location 
where they can wait for rescue in relative safety. 
 
Phase three is the rescue phase. The goal is to transfer the 
crew from the temporary refuge reached in phase to, to a safe 
location. In practice, this involves transfer of the evacuees 
from life rafts and life boats to land, rescue vessels or other 
petroleum installations. The transfer can be performed directly 
or via helicopters and MOB boats. 
 
2.2  SOLAS Chapter  III (Life – saving appliances and 
arrangements) 
SOLAS is the abbreviation for Safety of Life at Sea 
Treaty. It is an international treaty promoting the safety of life 
at sea. It is one of the most important of all international 
treaties affecting merchant shipping. This treaty represents a 
significant advance in the modernization of regulations for the 
shipping industry. Among other things it provides for traffic 
separation schemes and revisions to the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.  
 
The first SOLAS convention was adopted in 1914 as a result 
of the Titanic disaster, and was followed by the second in 
1929, the third in 1948, and the fourth in 1960. In 1974, it was 
again amended to include all the amendments up to that time. 
The 1974 convention has also been amended several times. 
2.2.1 Regulation 3 
  Definitions 
 Free –fall launching is that method of launching a 
survival craft whereby the craft with its complement 
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of persons and equipment on board is released and 
allowed to fall into the sea without any restraining 
apparatus.  
 International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code 
(referred to as “the Code” in this chapter) means the 
International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code 
adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
Organization by resolution MSC.48(66), as it may be 
amended by the Organization, provided that such 
amendments are adopted, brought into force and take 
effect in accordance with the provisions of article VIII 
of the present Convention concerning the amendment 
procedures applicable to the annex other than chapter 
I. 
 Launching appliance or arrangement is a means of 
transferring a survival craft or rescue boat from its 
stowed position safely to the water. 
2.2.2 Regulation 11 
  Survival craft muster and embarkation arrangements 
 Lifeboats and liferafts for which approved launching 
appliances are required shall be stowed as close to 
accommodation and service spaces as possible. 
 Muster and embarkation stations shall be readily 
accessible from accommodation and work areas. 
 Davit-launched and free-fall launched survival craft 
muster and embarkation stations shall be so arranged 
as to enable stretcher cases to be placed in survival 
craft. 
2.2.3 Regulation 17 
Rescue boat embarkation, launching, and recovery 
arrangements 
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 The rescue boat embarkation and launching 
arrangements shall be such that the rescue boat can be 
boarded and launched in the shortest possible time. 
 Recovery time of the rescue boat shall be not more 
than 5 min in moderate sea conditions when loaded 
with its full complement of persons and equipment. If 
the rescue boat is also a lifeboat, this recovery time 
shall be possible when loaded with its lifeboat 
equipment and the approved rescue boat complement 
of at least six persons. 
 Rescue boat embarkation and recovery arrangements 
shall allow for safe and efficient handling of a 
stretcher case. Foul weather recovery strops shall be 
provided for safety if heavy fall blocks constitute a 
danger. 
2.2.4 Regulation 19 
  Emergency training and drills 
 Familiarity with safety installations and practice 
musters 
 Drills shall, as far as practicable, be conducted as if 
there were an actual emergency 
2.2.5 Regulation 20 
  Operational readiness, maintenance and inspections 
 Operational readiness 
 Maintenance 
 Maintenance of falls 
 Spares and repair equipment 
 Weekly inspection 
 Monthly inspections 
 Periodic servicing of launching appliances and on-
load release gear 
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Measures to prevent accidents with Lifeboats, The 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its eighty-first session 
10 to 19 May 2006, recalled that at its seventy-fifth session 
(15 to 24 May 2002), it had considered the issue of the 
unacceptably high number of accidents with lifeboats in 
which crew were being injured, sometimes fatally, while 
participating in lifeboat drills and/or inspections. Chapter III - 
Life-saving appliances and arrangements. The Chapter 
includes requirements for life-saving appliances and 
arrangements, including requirements for life boats, rescue 
boats and life jackets according to type of ship. The 
International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code gives 
specific technical requirements for LSAs and is mandatory 
under Regulation 34, which states that all life-saving 
appliances and arrangements shall comply with the applicable 
requirements of the LSA Code. 
 
2.3  Life Saving Appliances (LSA) Code 
         International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code 
(referred to as “the Code” in this chapter) means the 
International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code adopted by 
the Maritime Safety Committee of the Organization by 
resolution MSC.48(66), as it may be amended by the 
Organization, provided that such amendments are adopted, 
brought into force and take effect in accordance with the 
provisions of article VIII of the present Convention 
concerning the amendment procedures applicable to the 
Annex other than chapter I. 
2.4  Lifeboats 
There are different types of lifeboats used on board a ship 
on the basis of the type of ship and other special requirements. 
Not all the lifeboats have the same type of releasing 
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mechanisms, for the launching of a lifeboat depends on 
several other factors.  
 
2.4.1  Open Lifeboats 
The open lifeboat was once, by far, the most common 
type of lifeboat. Due to SOLAS requirements, open lifeboats 
are no longer installed on ships or platforms. 
 
2.4.2  Partially enclosed lifeboats 
Partially enclosed lifeboats are, as the name suggests, 
lifeboats which are not totally enclosed. The superstructure of 
the lifeboat has large openings for efficient embarkation, and 
to allow pick-up of people from the sea. The openings can be 
covered by tarpaulins or similar arrangements to provide 
protection from the weather. Launching is performed by 
means of winches, wires and hooks by controlled lowering to 
sea level.  
 
Figure 2.1 Partially enclosed lifeboat 
One area of use for these boats is on passenger vessels, 
e.g. cruise ships, where lifeboats with a high capacity are 
required to evacuate a large number of passengers and crew 
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with a relatively small number of lifeboats. Some partially 
enclosed lifeboats are multifunctional, i.e. they can be used in 
situations other than evacuation, such as transport of 
passengers between an anchored cruise ship and shore. 
 
2.4.3  Totally enclosed lifeboats 
 Totally enclosed lifeboats, often referred to as TEMPSC 
(totally enclosed motor propelled survival crafts), protect the 
occupants from weather, waves and cold temperatures. All 
openings in the superstructure are in the form of hatches 
which can be closed. The lifeboats are stored in davits, 
connected to winches, wires and hooks for controlled 
lowering to sea level.  
 
Figure 2.2 Totally enclosed lifeboats 
 The lifeboat is boarded in the stored position or at an 
embarkation deck, and then lowered to the water surface with 
the occupants on board. The hooks are released when the 
lifeboat is fully lowered and is afloat, and the lifeboat then 
maneuvers away from the abandoned vessel or installation 
under its own power. The propulsion gear consists of a diesel 
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engine, conventional propeller and a propeller nozzle for 
steering. The conning position is positioned in the stern. 
Totally enclosed lifeboats are used on ships, drilling rigs and 
offshore platforms. In general, they have lower weight than 
free fall lifeboats, which may be a significant argument for 
ships and floating installations where the deadweight is 
limited. 
 
2.4.4  Free fall lifeboats 
 Free fall lifeboats are stored in davits, either hanging by 
wire and quick release hook or standing on sloping skids, held 
back by a retaining mechanism. The lifeboat is boarded in the 
stored position. When boarding is completed and all 
occupants are secured in their seats, the hook or retaining 
mechanism is released and the lifeboat falls freely to the 
surface.  
 
Figure 2.3 Free fall Lifeboats 
 The energy from the fall is converted to a forward 
motion, securing that the lifeboat moves quickly away from 
the abandoned vessel. Free fall lifeboats are in wide use on oil 
platforms and on new drilling rigs. They are also required on 
certain ships, such as new ore carriers and tankers. The 
maximum approved launch height is up to 35 meters, 
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depending on model and manufacturer. In full scale trials 
lifeboats have been dropped from 55 meters. 
 
Some ships have freefall lifeboats, stored on a downward 
sloping slipway normally on stern of vessel. These free fall 
lifeboats drop into the water as holdback is released. Such 
lifeboats are considerably heavier as they are strongly 
constructed to survive the impact with water. Freefall 
lifeboats are used for their capability to launch nearly 
instantly and high reliability in any conditions, and since 2006 
are required on bulk carriers that are in danger of sinking too 
rapidly for conventional lifeboats to be released. Seagoing oil 
rigs are also customarily equipped with this type of lifeboat 
 
Freefall Lifeboats are designed as escape capsules for 
crew abandoning ship or a rig, and provide a safe and swift 
means of evacuation. They have been used for a number of 
years and have been responsible for saving many lives. For 
the safety of lives, the regulators have always considered the 
lifeboats to be the most important and the life rafts more as a 
supplement. Among seamen, however, for many years there 
has been a lack of confidence in lifeboats, which have been 
seen as rather difficult and dangerous to launch. There has 
been a need and a requirement for lifeboat exercises in which 
all members of the crew had to participate. 
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Figure 2.4 Free fall lifeboat on davit 
The need for lifeboats as opposed to other lifesaving 
apparatus is based on the concept that the survival craft should 
be capable of being navigated independently. This stems from 
an era when communications were poor or even non-existent. 
There are numerous examples of survivors undertaking 
remarkable feats of seamanship in navigating lifeboats over 
long distances to a safe haven. It is almost inconceivable that 
this would be required in these days of Global Maritime 
Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) when a vessel in 
difficulty can quickly and automatically summon assistance  
 
Free-fall lifeboats have a number of advantages when 
compared with conventional davit-launched lifeboats. These 
advantages include: 
• faster and more efficient evacuation, 
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• a single stern-mounted lifeboat instead of port and starboard  
lifeboats, 
• means for secondary launching, 
• always stowed in the ready-to-launch position, 
• boat is propelled clear of the vessel during the launch, 
• fewer tasks required for launch, 
• safer evacuation, particularly from vessels having a high 
freeboard, and 
• improved economy over a 20-year period. 
 
Since it was formed in 1989, the MAIB (Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch) has received a number of 
reports about seafarers being injured, and sometimes killed, in 
accidents involving lifeboats. Scrutiny of the data held by the 
MAIB (Marine Accident Investigation Branch) suggests that 
anyone using a lifeboat, be it in a drill or a genuine 
evacuation, runs a risk of being injured or even killed.  
 
Recently, free-fall lifeboats are becoming popular due to 
the fact that many life threatening accidents have occurred 
with conventional lifeboat systems. Most of the accidents 
happened during launching and after lowering the boat into 
the rough seas in high wind. During launch, the lifeboat may 
hit the sides of the distressed vessel, become severely 
damaged and occupants may fall into the sea causing injury 
and even death. It is impossible to launch the lifeboat if the 
parent vessel is listing significantly or if the falling becomes 
tangled. After lowering the boat into the water, it may be 
unable to move away from the distressed vessel if high seas 
and winds continually push the lifeboat towards the parent 
vessels or due to the inability of the engine to start. These 
situations become even more dangerous during fire or when 
the potential for an explosion exists. Many of the risks 
associated with conventional lifeboat systems have been 
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substantially reduced by the free-fall lifeboat system. These 
problems are minimized with the free-fall lifeboat because it 
is not lowered into the sea. The free-fall lifeboat falls freely 
into the sea, generating kinetic energy as it does so. The 
kinetic energy, which is developed, propels the lifeboat away 
from the distressed vessel during and immediately after water 
entry. The lifeboat moves away from the danger even if the 
engine does not operate. 
 
2.5  General Description 
A lifeboat is a kind of boat that is used to escape a 
larger sinking structure such as a cruise ship, commercial 
vessel, or aircraft that has landed in the water. A lifeboat is 
intended only for use in case of an emergency. Lifeboats may 
also be used if the larger structure is not sinking but is 
experiencing some other sort of disaster such as a fire that has 
become out of control. Lifeboats are almost always intended 
for use solely in the event of an emergency. 
 
 Lifeboats have traditionally been made out of wood, 
and some still are. However, these days, it is very common for 
a lifeboat to be made out of durable plastic or water-resistant 
tarp. A plastic lifeboat is usually inflatable. Furthermore, they 
are often referred to as life rafts. Most airplanes, especially 
commercial airplanes, come equipped with life rafts which are 
to be used in the event of an emergency water landing. 
 
Free fall lifeboats are totally enclosed lifeboats, and is 
similar to the enclosed lifeboats in some ways. Openings for 
embarkation etc. are covered by watertight hatches which 
must be closed before launch. Propulsion is provided by an 
inboard diesel engine and a conventional propeller, and 
steering is provided by a propeller nozzle. Navigation is 
performed from the conning position, which on most free fall 
lifeboats is positioned in the aft of the boat. 
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Free-fall lifeboats are stored and boarded in the davit. 
They are stored on sloping longitudinal skids which are 
approximately the same length as the craft, with locking 
devices which hold it in position. When the boat is released it 
slides longitudinally off the skids and falls freely to the water 
surface without any ropes or wires connecting it to the ship or 
installation from which it is launched. Some models have an 
alternative arrangement without skids, where the lifeboat is 
released in a direct vertical direction, and enters the water 
with no initial forward velocity. In both alternatives, the 
lifeboat hits the water with the bow first at a forward heeling 
angle, which causes it to move forward and away from the 
ship or installation. The launching process is illustrated in 
Figure 18, which shows a full size life boat trial performed by 
launching the lifeboat from a steel frame which acts as the 
davit. For the trial, the steel frame is suspended in a floating 
crane.  
 
Figure 2.5 Full scale free fall lifeboat trial 
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Compared to conventional lifeboats, free-fall lifeboats 
provide a very quick escape, and the launching method 
involves a low risk for incidents during the launch which may 
occur for conventional lifeboats. Free fall lifeboats are 
therefore in use on many oil rigs, platforms, bulk carriers and 
ships which carry dangerous cargo. 
 
Free fall lifeboat davits are purpose built for each 
lifeboat model, and are able to launch the lifeboat both by the 
free-fall method and a secondary launching method involving 
wires, winches and a lifting frame. They are also capable of 
recovering the lifeboat to the stored position. A wide variety 
of lifeboat models is available with different sizes and 
specifications, depending on the needs of the vessel in 
question and the applicable rules and regulations. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Water entry phase 
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Figure 2.7 Water exit phase 
2.6 Free-Fall Lifeboats Stowage Plan for Equipment : 
It is important that a lifeboat be quite durable, as the 
passengers sometimes have to wait quite a while before they 
are rescued. Many of the boats come equipped with materials 
that allow passengers to protect themselves from the elements 
until help arrives. Some even come with a package of 
materials which may include a first aid kit, oars, flares, 
mirrors which can be used for signaling, food, potable water, 
tools to catch drinkable rainwater, and fishing equipment. 
Some lifeboats are prepared for self-rescue. This means that 
they have supplies such as navigational equipment and a small 
engine or sail. 
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Figure 2.8 Stowage Plan of Free fall lifeboats 
1) BUOYANT BAILER 
2) BUCKETS 
3) HATCHETS 
4) CONTEINER WITH DISTRESS SIGNAL AS : 
HAND FIARES 
ROCKET PARACHUTE FIARES 
BUOYANT SMOKE SIGNALES ORANGE 
DAYLIGHT SIGNAL MIRROR 
JACKKNIFE WITH TIN OPENER AND 
MARLING, SPIKE 
ELECTR. TORCH WITH 1 SPARE BULB AND 2 
SPARE BATTERIES 
5) TIN OPENER 
6) FIRE EXTINGUISHER 
7) FISHING TACKLE 
8) WHISTLE 
9) ITRS. CONTAINERS WITH DRINK WATER 
10) LIFEBOAT FOOD RATION 
11) DRINK CUPS 
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12) SEA ANCHOR TOWING AND MORING LINE 
13) PAINTERS 
14) BUOYANT LINES 
15) FIRST AID KIT FOR LIFEBOATS WITH 
SEATHICKNESS  
16) LIFEBOAT COMPASS 
17) MANUAL BILGE PUMP 
18) RADAR REFLECTOR  
19) DIESEL-FUEL 
20) BOAT HOOKS 
21) SEARCH LIGHT 
22) THERMAL PROTECTIVE AIDS 
23) SURVIVAL-MANUAL 
24) EMBARKATION LADDER LOOSE EQUIPMENT 
25) KEY FOR SEALTS/FUEL TANK 
26) SET LIFTING SLINGS 
27) EMERGENCY TILLER 
28) STRAPS FOR STRETCHER 
SPARE PARTS FOR THE ENGINE : 
29) VEE-BELT 
30) FUEL FILTER 
31) PUMP IMPELLER 
32) OIL FILTER 
33) SET OF COMMON TOOLS 
34) OIL DRAIN PUMP 
2.7 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is typically applied as an aid to the 
decision-making process. As options are evaluated, it is 
critical to analyze the level of risk introduced with each 
option. The analysis can address financial risks, health risks, 
safety risks, environmental risks and other types of business 
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risks. An appropriate analysis of these risks will provide 
information which is critical to good decision making, and 
will often clarify the decision to be made. The information 
generated through risk assessment can often be communicated 
to the organization to help impacted parties understand the 
factors which influenced the decision.  
 
Risk assessment is not a new field. Formal risk 
assessment techniques have their origins in the insurance 
industry. As the industrial age progressed, and businesses 
began to make large capital investments, it became a business 
necessity to understand the risks associated with the 
enterprises being undertaken and to be able to manage the risk 
using control measures and insurance. For insurance 
companies to survive, it became imperative that they be able 
to calculate the risks associated with the insured activities. 
Risk assessment is the process of gathering data and 
synthesizing information to develop an understanding of the 
risk of a particular enterprise. To gain an understanding of the 
risk of an operation, one must answer the following three 
questions: 
 
i) What can go wrong? 
 
ii) How likely is it? 
 
iii) What are the impacts? 
 
To use a systematic method to determine risk levels, the Risk 
Assessment Process is applied. This 
process consists of four basic steps: 
 
i) Hazard Identification 
 
ii) Frequency Analysis 
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iii) Consequence Analysis, and 
 
iv) Risk Evaluation 
 
The level of information needed to make a decision 
varies widely. In some cases, after identifying the hazards, 
qualitative methods of assessing frequency and consequence 
are satisfactory to enable the risk evaluation. In other cases, a 
more detailed quantitative analysis is required. The Risk 
Assessment Process is illustrated in Figure 11, and the results 
possible from qualitative and quantitative approaches are 
described. 
 
Figure 2.9 The risk assessment process 
There are many different analysis techniques and models 
that have been developed to aid in conducting risk 
assessments A key to any successful risk analysis is choosing 
the right method (or combination of methods) for the situation 
at hand. For each step of the Risk Assessment Process, this 
Chapter provides a brief introduction to some of the analysis 
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methods available and suggests risk analysis approaches to 
support different types of decision making within the 
maritime and offshore industries. For more information on 
applying a particular method or tool, consult the references 
noted. 
2.7.1 Hazards or Threats 
Hazards or threats are conditions which exist which may 
potentially lead to an undesirable event. 
 
2.7.2 Controls 
Controls are the measures taken to prevent hazards from 
causing undesirable events. Controls can be physical (safety 
shutdowns, redundant controls, conservative designs, etc.), 
procedural (written operating procedures), and can address 
human factors (employee selection, training, supervision). 
2.7.3 Event 
An event is an occurrence that has an associated outcome. 
There are typically a number of potential outcomes from any 
one initial event which may range in severity from trivial to 
catastrophic, depending upon other conditions and add-on 
events. 
2.7.4 Risk 
Now we are ready to provide a technical definition of the term 
risk. Risk is composed of two elements, frequency and 
consequence. Risk is defined as the product of the frequency 
with which an event is anticipated to occur and the 
consequence of the event’s outcome. 
Risk = Frequency x Consequence 
 
2.7.5 Frequency 
The frequency of a potential undesirable event is expressed as 
events per unit time, usually per year. The frequency should 
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be determined from historical data if a significant number of 
events have occurred in the past. Often, however, risk 
analyses focus on events with more severe consequences (and 
low frequencies) for which little historical data exist. In such 
cases, the event frequency is calculated using risk assessment 
models. 
2.7.6 Consequence 
Consequence can be expressed as the number of people 
affected (injured or killed), property damaged, amount of 
spill, area affected, outage time, mission delay, dollars lost, 
etc. Regardless of the measure chosen, the consequences are 
expressed “per event”. Thus the above equation has the units 
“events/year” times “consequences/event”, which equals 
“consequences/year”, the most typical quantitative risk 
measure. 
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2.7.7 Overview of Risk Assessment Methods 
 
Figure 2.10 Overview of risk assessment 
2.8 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Method 
FMEA is an inductive reasoning approach that is best 
suited for reviews of mechanical and electrical hardware 
systems. This technique is not appropriate to broader marine 
issues such as harbor transit or overall vessel safety. The 
FMEA technique, considers how the failure mode of each 
system component can result in system performance problems 
and ensures that appropriate safeguards against such problems 
are in place. This technique is applicable to any well-defined 
system, but the primary use is for reviews of mechanical and 
electrical systems (e.g., fire suppression systems, vessel 
steering/propulsion systems). It also is used as the basis for 
defining and optimizing planned maintenance for equipment 
because the method systematically focuses directly and 
individually on equipment failure modes. FMEA generates 
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qualitative descriptions of potential performance problems 
(failure modes, root causes, effects, and safeguards) and can 
be expanded to include quantitative failure frequency and/or 
consequence estimates. 
 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a step-
by-step approach for identifying all possible failures in a 
design, a manufacturing or assembly process, or a product or 
service. “Failure modes” means the ways, or modes, in which 
something might fail. Failures are any errors or defects, 
especially ones that affect the customer, and can be potential 
or actual. “Effects analysis” refers to studying the 
consequences of those failures. Failures are prioritized 
according to how serious their consequences are, how 
frequently they occur and how easily they can be detected. 
The purpose of the FMEA is to take actions to eliminate or 
reduce failures, starting with the highest-priority ones. Failure 
modes and effects analysis also documents current knowledge 
and actions about the risks of failures, for use in continuous 
improvement. FMEA is used during design to prevent 
failures. Later it’s used for control, before and during ongoing 
operation of the process. Ideally, FMEA begins during the 
earliest conceptual stages of design and continues throughout 
the life of the product or service. 
 
FMEA method was conducted to analyze the potential 
for errors or failures in the system and the potential identified 
will be classified according to the magnitude of potential 
failure and its effect on the process.  
 
2.8.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Worksheet 
The FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) Worksheet is 
a tool to help you systematically plan for possible problems 
with a product or process. 
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Figure 2.11 FMEA Worksheet 
1. An “item” is the focus of the FMEA project.  
 
2. A “function” is what the item or process is intended  
to do, usually to a given standard of performance or  
requirement.  
 
3. A “failure mode” is the manner in which the item or 
operation potentially fails to meet or deliver the 
             intended function and associated requirements.  
 
4. An “effect” is the consequence of the failure on the  
system or end user.  
5. “Severity” is a ranking number associated with the 
most serious effect for a given failure mode  
 
6. A “cause” is the specific reason for the failure,  
preferably found by asking “why” until the root cause  
is determined.  
 
7. “Occurrence” is a ranking number associated with the 
likelihood that the failure mode and its associated 
cause will be present in the item being analyzed.  
 
8. “Controls” are the methods or actions currently 
planned, or are already in place, to reduce or 
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eliminate the risk associated with each potential 
cause.  
 
9. “Detection” is a ranking number associated with the 
best control from the list of detection-type controls, 
based on the criteria from the detection scale.  
 
10. “RPN” is a numerical ranking of the risk of each 
potential failure mode/cause, made up of the 
arithmetic product of the three elements:  severity of 
the effect, likelihood of occurrence of the cause, 
likelihood of detection of the cause.  
 
11. “Recommended actions” are the tasks recommended 
by the FMEA team to reduce or eliminate the risk 
associated with potential causes of failure. They 
should consider  
 
12. “Action Taken” is the specific action that is 
implemented to reduce risk to an acceptable level.  
 
 
 
For this bachelor thesis will be use FMEA worksheet by IEC 
60812 standard. 
31 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12 IEC 60812 FMEA Worksheet Standard 
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2.8.2 Severity Criteria 
In general, severity assesses how serious the effects 
would be should the potential risk occur. Ranking Guidelines 
based on International Marine Contractors Association 
(IMCA) M 166 2002. 
 
Table 2.1 Severity criteria 
 
 
2.8.3 Probability of Occurrence Criteria 
In general, the probability of occurrence evaluates the 
frequency that potential risk(s) will occur for a given system 
or situation. The probability score is rated against the 
probability that the effect occurs as a result of a failure mode. 
Table 2.1 Occurence criteria 
 
 
2.8.4 Detectability Criteria 
In general, detectability is the probability of the 
failure being detected before the impact of the failure to the 
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system or process being evaluated is detected. The 
detectability score is rated against the ability to detect the 
effect of the failure mode or the ability to detect the failure 
mode itself. 
2.9 Frequency Analysis Method 
After the hazards of a system or process have been 
identified, the next step in performing a risk assessment is to 
estimate the frequency at which the hazardous events may 
occur. The following are some of the techniques and tools 
available for frequency assessment. 
 
2.9.1 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Event tree analysis utilizes decision trees to 
graphically model the possible outcomes of an initiating event 
capable of producing an end event of interest. This type of 
analysis can provide qualitative descriptions of potential 
problems (combinations of events producing various types of 
problems from initiating events) and quantitative estimates of 
event frequencies or likelihoods, which assist in 
demonstrating the relative importance of various failure 
sequences. Event tree analysis may be used to analyze almost 
any sequence of events, but is most effectively used to address 
possible outcomes of initiating events for which multiple 
safeguards are in line as protective features. 
 
2.9.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive analysis that 
graphically models (using Boolean logic) how logical 
relationships among equipment failures, human errors and 
external events can combine to cause specific mishaps of 
interest. Similar to event tree analysis, this type of analysis 
can provide, qualitative descriptions of potential problems 
(combinations of events causing specific problems of interest) 
and quantitative estimates of failure frequencies/likelihoods 
and the relative importance of various failure 
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sequences/contributing events. This methodology can also be 
applied to many types of applications, but is most effectively 
used to analyze system failures caused by relatively complex 
combinations of events. The logical structure of a fault tree 
can be expressed in terms of Boolean algebraic equa- tions. 
Boolean algebra is used to reduce equations composed of 
variables that can take on only two values. It is commonly 
used to describe the operations of power switching grids, 
computer memories, or logic diagrams.  
 
The benefits of FTA include : 
 Identify failures deductively, Using the logic of a detailed 
failure analysis and tools like 5 whys, FTA helps the 
team focus on the causes of each event in a logical 
sequence that leads to the failure. 
 
 Highlight the important elements of system related to 
system failure, The FTA process may lead to a single 
component or material that causes many paths to failure, 
thus improving that one element may minimize the 
possibly of many failures. 
 
 Create a graphical aid for system analysis and 
management, Apparently managers like graphics, and for 
complex systems it helps to focus the team on critical 
elements. 
 
 Provides an alternatively way to analysis the system, 
FMEA, RBD and other tools permit a way to explore 
system reliability, FTA provide a tool that focuses on 
failure modes one at a time. Sometimes a shift in the 
frame of reference illuminates new and important 
elements of the system. 
 
 Focus on one fault at a time, The FTA can start with an 
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overall failure mode, like the car not starting, or it can 
focus on one element of the vehicle failing, like the 
airbag not inflating as expected within a vehicle. The 
team chooses the area for focus at the start of the 
analysis. 
 
 Expose system behavior and possible interactions, FTA 
allows the examination of the many ways a fault may 
occur and may expose non-obvious paths to failure that 
other analysis approaches miss. 
 
 Account for human error, FTA includes hardware, 
software, and human factors in the analysis as needed. 
The FTA approach includes the full range of causes for a 
failure. 
 
The steps of FTA  by Hank Marquis (2006) include : 
 Select a top level event for analysis. 
 
 Identify faults that could lead to the top level event. 
 
 For each fault, list as many causes as possible in boxes 
below the related fault 
 
 Draw a diagram of the “fault tree.” 
 
 
 Continue identifying causes for each fault until you reach 
a root cause, or one that you can do something about. 
 
 Consider countermeasures. 
 
2.9.3 Analysis of Historical Data 
The best way to assign a frequency to an event is to 
research industry databases and locate good historical 
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frequency data which relates to the event being analyzed. 
Before applying historical frequency data, a thoughtful 
analysis of the data should be performed to determine its 
applicability to the event being evaluated. The analyst needs 
to consider the source of the data, the statistical quality of the 
data (reporting accuracy, size of data set, etc.) and the 
relevance of the data to the event being analyzed. For 
example, transportation data relating to helicopter crashes in 
the North Sea may not be directly applicable to Gulf of 
Mexico operations due to significant differences in 
atmospheric conditions and the nature of helicopter operating 
practices. In another case, frequency data for a certain type of 
vessel navigation equipment failure may be found to be based 
on a very small sample of reported failures, resulting in a 
number which is not statistically valid. 
 
2.10 Risk Matrix 
Another method to characterize risk is categorization. In 
this case, the analyst must define the likelihood and 
consequence categories to be used in evaluating each scenario 
and define the level of risk associated with 
likelihood/consequence category combination. Frequency and 
consequence categories can be developed in a qualitative or 
quantitative manner. Qualitative schemes (i.e., low, medium, 
or high) typically use qualitative criteria and examples of each 
category to ensure consistent event classification. Multiple 
consequence classification criteria may be required to address 
safety, environmental, operability and other types of 
consequences. 
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Figure 2.13 IMCA M 166 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis will discuss the Risk Assessment on a Free-
Fall Lifeboat with the purpose of determining whether an 
Free-Fall Lifeboat have a risk that is acceptable or not, create 
awareness about the dangers and risks obtained from the Free-
Fall Lifeboat. It aims to reduce the possibility of danger by 
adding steps - necessary control measures and precautions. 
The assessment also prioritize hazards and help determine 
whether the existing control measures are adequate. A risk 
assessment carried out by the “FMEA (Failure Modes and 
Effect Annalysis)” method. Here is a schematic of the 
research methodology to be done:  
 
3.1  Background and Problem Identification 
The first stage is to identify and formulate the problem. 
In this thesis is to analyze problems taken risks in the process 
of lifeboat Free-fall launching. However, the extent to which 
these risks will occur and of whether the consequences that 
would arise. Hence the need for a measurement of risk, 
namely the risk assessment method FMEA (Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis) which is based on data that have been 
obtained as well as the standards used to certify whether the 
risk is acceptable or not and then if it can not be accepted we 
need some mitigation of the consequences of risk. 
3.2 Study Literatures 
The literature study was done by collecting various 
references to support the work and writing of this bachelor 
thesis. References required regarding Launching operation, 
Manufacture of Free-fall Lifeboat, some Journal, book, paper, 
internet and the data that is required in order to support the 
work of bachelor thesis. 
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3.3 Data Collection 
 Collecting data is done in order to support the thesis 
progress. The collection of data that are needed include 
informations the process of Free-fall lifeboat launching, 
General Arrangement, Launching Introduction and the data is 
that is required in order to support the work of the bachelor 
thesis. 
 
3.4 Identify Process of Free-fall Launching and 
Recovery 
 At this stage the understanding of the process Free-
fall lifeboat launching consisting of Launch Behavior of Free-
fall Lifeboat, Launch Simulation of a Free-fall Lifeboat  
 
Figure 3.1 Scope of process 
Free Fall 
Lifeboat
Launching 
Launch by 
Free Fall
Preparations 
Before 
Launching
Free Fall 
Launching
Recovery
Recovery 
Operation by 
Wire
Preparations 
Before 
Launching
Boat set 
Position
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3.5 Data Analyze Using FMEA Worksheet 
 Potential cause of failure describes how a process 
failure could occur, in terms of something that can be 
controlled or corrected. The goal is to describe the direct 
relationship that exists between the cause and resulting 
process failure mode. The data in order from PT. Surya 
Segara and based on DNV – OS – E406. Also the standard of 
FMEA Worksheet is based on International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) 60812 Analysis techniques for system 
reliability – Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA). 
3.6 Frequency Analysis, Consequence Analysis and 
Detection Analysis 
 Analysis of the data in order to determine the levels of 
risk. The standards for frequency analysis, consequence 
analysis, and detection analysis is based on International 
Marine Contractors Association (IMCA M 166). Also the 
number of frequency are generated from Basis Event  from 
several source such as DNV Technica 1983, ANNEX III: 
FSA/LSA/BC: FREE-FALL LIFEBOAT AS RCO, and UK 
HSE RR599 2007. 
3.7 Risk Evaluation 
 Analysis of the data in order to determine the levels of 
danger posed using the results of risk priority. By using Table 
Occurance, FTA and ETA for frequency analysis and severity 
from IMCA for consequence analysis.  
3.8 Mitigation 
If there are any intolerable risk after the risk 
evaluation, then will be do a mitigation act to minimize those 
risk by using LOPA method. 
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3.9 Conclusion and Recommendation 
Make conclusions based on the results obtained and 
suggestions for further research development. 
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START
Background and Problem 
Identification
Study Literatures Book, Journal, 
and Paper
Drawing of 
Lifeboat, 
Freefall  Release 
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Process 
Data Analyze Using FMEA Worksheet :
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Data Analysis 
On this chapter will be discussed further on about all data that 
required. Analyze data will be appropriated to the scope of 
problems which had determined. 
 
4.1.2 General Arrangement of Free-Fall Davit : 
 
Figure 4.1 General Arrangement 
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4.1.3 Launching Operation 
Analyzing by overview step for launching operation will be 
shown as figure 4.2 below 
 
Figure 4.2 Launching operation 
 
Preparation before launching
Remove the lashing line
Release lashing plate
Ensure the drain are closed
Release lever up and down several 
times to release the main lashings
Launch by free fall
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4.1.4 Retrieval Operation 
Analyzing by overview step for retrieval operation will be 
shown as figure 4.3 below 
 
Figure 4.3 Retrieval operation 
Turn on the hydraulic 
power pack system
Move the davit arm to 
the lowering position
Lowering the suspension 
for hanging the boat
Hoist the boat
Store the davit arm in 
the boat set position
Lower the boat until it 
mounts the roller
Repeat operation of 
storing & Hoisting 
Set the main lashing
Set the hook lashing line 
to the suspension
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4.1.5 Launch Behavior of Free-Fall Lifeboats : 
The configuration of a free-fall lifeboat at the beginning 
of a launch is shown in figure 6 The free-fall height is 
measured from the water surface to the lowest point on the 
lifeboat when the lifeboat is in its launch position. The 
primary factors that affect the launch performance of a free-
fall lifeboat are its mass and mass distribution, the length and 
angle of the launch ramp, and the free-fall height. These 
parameters interact to affect the orientation and velocity of the 
lifeboat at the time of water impact, the acceleration forces 
experienced by the occupants, and the headway of the lifeboat 
immediately after water entry.  
The launch of a free-fall lifeboat can be divided into four 
distinct phases. These are the ramp phase, the rotation phase, 
the free-fall phase, and the water entry phase. The ramp phase 
is that part of the launch when the lifeboat is sliding along the 
launch ramp. The ramp phase ends when the center-of-gravity 
(CG) passes the end of launch ramp and the lifeboat begins to 
rotate; this rotation marks the beginning of the rotation phase. 
The rotation phase ends when the lifeboat is no longer in 
contact with the launch ramp. This is the beginning of the 
free-fall phase; the lifeboat is falling freely through the air. 
The water entry phase begins when the lifeboat first contacts 
the surface of the water and continues until the lifeboat has 
returned to the surface and is behaving as a boat.  
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Figure 4.4 Launch behavior of free-fall lifeboats 
 
4.1.6 Launch Simulation of a Free-fall Lifeboat : 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Different phases of a free-fall lifeboat 
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4.1.6.1 Sliding Phase 
Sliding of boat begins when it is released and ends when the 
center of gravity (G) is crossing a point close to the end of the 
launch skid. During this phase the lifeboat is constrained to 
slide along the skid, so it cannot rotate. The velocity of the 
lifeboat at the end of the launch skid is mostly dependent 
upon the length of the launch skid in front of the lifeboat. 
 
4.1.6.2 Rotation Phase 
This rotation phase of the free-fall launch begins as the sliding 
ends and it continues until the boat is no longer in contact 
with the launch skid 
4.1.6.3 Free-fall Phase 
The free-fall phase of the launch begins at the end of the 
rotation phase and continues until the boat touches the water 
surface. 
4.1.6.4 Water Entry Phase 
The water entry of the free-fall lifeboat begins at the end of 
the free fall phase. During the water entry phase, the boat is 
acted upon by hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. When 
the lifeboat first hit the water surface, high accelerations are 
experienced by the bow of the boat, this is bow impact. At 
that time, couple formed by the fluid forces and the weight of 
the lifeboat causes the angular momentum induced during the 
rotation phase to be reversed and the boat to return to even 
keel and this is stern impact. 
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4.1.7 Launching and Recovery Operation  
Preparation Before Launching : 
1. Check to ensure that there is no obstacle in the boat 
Fall path 
 
Figure 4.6 Preparation before launching 
2. Remove the Lasing Line 
 
Figure 4.7 Preparation before launching 
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3. Check to Ensure that the lashing plate has been 
released 
4. Check to ensure that the drain of the boat is closed 
 
Launch by Free Fall : 
1. The operator checks to ensure that preparation of the 
boat launching has been made without fault. 
2. The crew members board the boat from the rear hatch. 
3. The operator boards the boat last, and will closed the 
hatch from within. 
 
Figure 4.8 Hatch 
4. The operator checks to ensure that crew members are 
wearing seat belt securely. 
5. The operator takes a seat in the control compartment 
and wears a seat belt. 
6. The operator starts the engine in accordance with the 
boat operation manual. 
7. The procedures to start the engine are described on 
the side of the control compartment. 
8. The operator releases a pin with which the release 
lever has been secured. 
9. The operator operates the release lever up and down 
several times to release the main lashing.  
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Figure 4.9 Release lever 
10. Releasing of the main lashings allows the boat to be 
launched by a free fall. 
 
Figure 4.10 Launch by Free fall 
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Recovery Operation : 
1. Turn the main switch of the ship “on”.  
 
Figure 4.11 Hydraulic power pack 
2. The operator operates the control lever to move the 
davit arm outboard to the boat lowering position. 
3. The operator operates the control lever to lower the 
suspension to a position which allows the wire rope 
for hanging boat to be set. 
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Figure 4.12 Recovery operation 
4. The operator in the boat sets the wire rope for hanging 
boat to the suspension, after giving a signal to the 
operator on the depot ship, the operator in the boat 
takes a seat in the control compartment and wears a 
seat belt. Stop the engine in accordance with the boat 
operation manual. 
5. The operation hoist the boat after ensuring that the 
engine of the boat has come to a stop. Stop the 
hoisting 100mm before the position where the 
traverse will hit against the hinge block and the wire 
rope supporter. 
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Figure 4.13 Lifting position 
6. The operator operates the control lever to store the 
davit arm in the boat set position. 
7. Assign the operator to the platform and stop the boat 
in a position where the boat  will not touch the davit 
rear span. 
8. The operator operates the control lever to lower the 
boat until it mounts the roller. 
9. The operator operates the control lever to repeat 
operation of storing and hoisting. The boat will be 
moved to a position which allows the boat to be set to 
the main lashing. 
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Figure 4.14 Stowed position 
10. Set the main lashing in accordance with the boat 
operation manual. The operation checks to ensure that 
the main lashing have been set. 
 
Figure 4.15 Main lashing 
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11. The crew members board from the boat to the depot 
ship from the rear hatch. 
12.  Lower the suspension until the wire rope for hanging 
boat comes fully loose. 
 
Figure 4.16 Release the suspension 
13. Release the wire rope for hanging boat to set it to the 
set plate. 
14. The operator operates the control lever to move the 
davit arm to the stowed position. The davit arms will 
hit against the arm support and stop automatically, but 
ensure to operate the lever by visual check. 
15. Set the hook lashing line to the suspension. 
16. Set the lashing line 
17. Set of the lashing plate to the lashing lines allows the 
automatic setting. 
18. The main power of the power pack is turned “off” 
19. Turn the main switch of the ship “off”. 
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4.2  Risk Identification 
The FMEA Worksheet is laid out in the logical 
progression of an FMEA investigation and analysis. The 
objective of worksheet is to ensure that all steps in the study 
have been addressed. 
Risk identification on this Bachelor Thesis do by 
understanding function of process launching which will be 
analyze. The result from risk identification is scenario of all 
failure modes. Example of failure modes list on FMEA 
worksheet has attached below. 
For the example is the risk identification of Retrieval 
Arrangement (RVL) which refer to Operation Manual of free 
fall lifeboat.  
 
Figure 4.17 Lifting position 
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The next step is identify every single step in retrieval 
arrangement, what can go wrong in retrieval arrangement.  
After obtaining possible of failure which can be generated, the 
next step is investigate cause, consequence and protection. For 
the consequence which has possibility of failure will use 
IMCA standard to determine the number of consequence. 
 
 
Figure 4.18 Risk Identify on FMEA Worksheet 
 
4.3  Risk Analysis 
 
After finished on risk identification step for lifeboat free fall 
launching, the next step is risk analysis to determine level of 
Frequency and Consequence which will be used as an input 
data for the risk analysis result from FMEA Worksheet 
Retrieval Arrangement (RVL). 
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Frequency value for each causes are decided from FTA 
method which had explained on sub-chapter 2.9. Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis. For value of Basic Event are 
generated from several source such as OREDA 2002, DNV 
Technica 1983, ANNEX III: FSA/LSA/BC: FREE-FALL 
LIFEBOAT AS RCO, and UK HSE RR599 2007. After 
obtained the value of Failure Rates and Probability of Failure, 
the value will be matched to that several source, depend on 
Probability Description. 
 
The FTA method will start from top event which refer to 
Possible Causes from FMEA worksheet. For each causes will 
be given a code to simplify the process. For example, failure 
on Hydraulic power pack system cannot work 
 
A1 RVL 2.3. 
 
A : First level contributor (It will  
 following alphabet for the next level) 
 
1 : First contribution (It will following 
numerical order for the next causes) 
 
RVL : System which have to identify from FMEA 
worksheet 
 
2 : Failure mode’s number, based on FMEA 
worksheet 
 
3 : Potential cause order 
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A1 RVL 2.3. (RVL 2.3) 
 
Causes of  Hydraulic power pack system can’t work 
A1: Loss of  power 
A2: Internal leakage on hydraulic motor 
A3 : Short circuit 
B1 : Fail to start on demand 
B2 : Breakdown 
B3 : Overheating 
B4 : Parameter deviation 
B5 : Structural deficiency 
B6 : Fail to start on demand 
B7 : High voltage inlet 
B8 : low voltage inlet  
C1 : Overheating 
C2 : Structural deficiency 
C3 : Overheating 
C4 : Structural deficiency 
The value of each event are decided based on gate type. 
Failure Probability for Basic Event will obtained from Failure 
Rates value.  
 
Boolean expression 
T  = B1+B2+B3+B4+B5+B6+C1+C2+C3+C4 
P(T)  = P(B1+B2+B3+B4+B5+B6+C1+C2+C3+C4) 
=P(B1)+P(B2)+P(B3)+P(B4)+P(B5)+P(B6)+P(B7)+
P(B8) 
=P(B1)+P(B2)+P(B3)+P(B4)+P(B5)+P(B6)+P(C1)+
P(C2)+P(C3)+P(C4) 
=P(B1)+P(B2)+P(B3)+P(B4)+P(B5)+P(B6)+P(C1)+
P(C2)+P(C3)+P(C4) − 
P(B1)+P(B2)+P(B3)+P(B4)+P(B5)+P(B6)+P(C1)+P(
C2)+P(C3)+P(C4) 
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= (2.09 × 10−5 + 8.47 × 10−6 + 2.19 × 10−6 +
3.33 × 10−6 + 7.46 × 10−6 + 2.09 × 10−6 + 2.19 ×
10−6 + 7.46 × 10−6 + 2.19 × 10−6 + 7.46 ×
10−6) − (2.09 × 10−5  ×  8.47 × 10−6  ×  2.19 ×
10−6  ×  3.33 × 10−6  ×  7.46 × 10−6  ×  2.09 ×
10−6  ×  2.19 × 10−6  ×  7.46 × 10−6  ×  2.19 ×
10−6  × 7.46 × 10−6) 
= 5.39 × 10−5 
 
Or other solution 
 C1 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1−𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 0.53 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PC1 = 1 - 𝑒−(0.53×10−6)×4.3894 = 2.19 × 10−6 
 
 C2 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 1.70 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PC2 = 1-𝑒−(1.70×10−6)×4.3894 = 7.46 × 10−6 
 
 C3 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
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P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 0.53 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PC3 = 1-𝑒−(0.53×10−6)×4.3894 = 2.19 × 10−6 
 
 C4 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1−𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 1.70 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PC4 = 1-𝑒−(1.70×10−6)×4.3894 = 7.46 × 10−6 
 
 B1 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 4.77 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PB1 = 1-𝑒−(4.77×10−6)×4.3894 = 2.09 × 10−5 
 
 B2 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 1.93 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
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PB2 = 1-𝑒−(1.93×10−6)×4.3894 = 8.47 × 10−6 
 
 B3 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 0.53 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PB3 = 1-𝑒−(0.53×10−6)×4.3894 = 2.19 × 10−6 
 
 B4 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 0.76 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PB4 = 1-𝑒−(0.76×10−6)×4.3894 = 3.33 × 10−6 
 
 B5 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 0.76 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PB5 = 1-𝑒−(1.70×10−6)×4.3894 = 7.46 × 10−6 
  
 B6 RVL 2.3. 
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P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002 : 4.77 × 10−6) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PB6 = 1-𝑒−(4.77×10−6)×4.3894 = 2.09 × 10−6 
 
 B7 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PB7 = (2.19 × 10−6) + (7.46 × 10−6)= 9.65 × 10−6 
 
 B8 RVL 2.3. 
 
P = 1 − 𝑒−𝛾𝑇 
 
P : Failure Probability 
     γ : Failure Rate (OREDA 2002) 
T : Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002 : 4.3894) 
 
PB8 = (2.19 × 10−6) + (7.46 × 10−6)= 9.65 × 10−6 
 
After finish with all basic event, then calculate the top event 
based on the gate. 
 
Because there is an OR Gate then,  
 
PA1 = PB1 + PB2 + PB3 + PB4 
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PA1 = 2.09 x 10-5  + 8.47 x 10-6   + 2.19 x 10-6  + 3.33 x 10-6  = 
3.48 x 10-5   
   
PA2 = PB5 + PB6  
PA2 = 7.46 x 10-6  + 2.09 x 10-6   = 9.55 x 10-6   
 
PA3 = PB7 (PC1 + PC2) + PB8 (PC3 + PC4) 
PA3 = PB7 (2.19 x 10-6   + 7.46 x 10-6  ) + PB8 (2.19 x 10-6   + 
7.46 x 10-6  ) 
PA3 = 9.65 x 10-6  + 9.65 x 10-6  = 9.55 x 10-6    
 
 
RVL 2.3. = PA1 + PA2 + PA3 
RVL 2.3. = 3.48 x 10-5   + 9.55 x 10-6   + 9.55 x 10-6  = 5.39 x 
10-5    
 
 
Causes of  Jerk in wire because of dynamic affects (RVL 1.1.) 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Overload of lifting arrangement 
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Causes of  Climbing on top of  lifeboat while connecting 
lifting hook (RVL 1.2.) 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Training 
 
 
 
 
 
Causes of  Loss of power (RVL 2.1.) 
A1: Higher voltage inlet 
A2: Lower voltage inlet 
A3 : Loss of power 
B1 : Overheating  
B2 : Structural deficiency 
B3 : Overheating 
B4 : Structural deficiency 
B5 : Fail to start on demand 
B6 : Breakdown 
B7 : Overheating 
B8 : Parameter deviation 
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Causes of  Error judgement (RVL 2.2.) 
A1: Error visual measuring 
A2: Error calibration 
B1 : Abnormal instrument reading 
B2 : Parameter deviation 
B3 : Structural deficiency 
B4 : Vibration 
 
 
 
 
 
Causes of  Stuck on panel (RVL 2.4.) 
A1: Failure on panel 
A2: Fail to control valve 
B1 : Vibration 
B2 : Structural deficiency 
B3 : Structural deficiency 
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B4 : Parameter deviation 
B5 : External leakage 
 
 
 
 
 
After obtaining all the value of frequency, the next step is 
determine the level of consequence, to determine the level of 
consequence will be use table of Severity Description (Page 
33). 
 
4.4  Risk Evaluation 
 
Risk evaluation will be the next step after risk analysis, for 
example from failure mode Failure on Control valve which 
stuck on panel. Based on table severity and table of 
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probability these failure has a level of severity on 3 and level 
of probability on 1. Both result will be plotted on risk matrix 
from International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) M 
166 2002. 
 
 
Figure 4.19 Consequence from Failure on Control Valve 
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Figure 4.20 Frequency from Failure on Control Valve 
Table 4.21 Severity Description from Failure on Control Valve 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Probability Description from Failure on Control Valve 
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Figure 4.22 Risk Matrix IMCA 
 
From Figure 35 shown that the Failure on Control Valve 
which stuck on panel has a level of risk on Low risk or 
Acceptable. Different with Figure 36 there’s result has a High 
Risk or Unacceptable. That is mean these failure shall be 
reduced. 
 
 
Figure 4.23 Risk Matrix IMCA 
76 
 
To reduce the risk level from these failure will use LOPA 
method for mitigation.  
Worksheet on the below shown the risk evaluation for 
Retrieval Arrangement (RVL).  
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4.5  Mitigation 
 
The last step will be kind of mitigation to reduce the level of 
risk that can happen. This mitigation is needed for high risk 
criteria. Whenever that high risk need to identify for 
protection and prevention to be adopted in order to reduce 
the frequency. 
Below is shown an example for mitigation task with LOPA 
method from worksheet FMEA Node No. 1 which is failure 
crack in hull caused by Insufficient (QA). 
 
From LOPA worksheet above the result is frequency for 
failure crack in hull caused by Insufficient (QA). The number 
of Insufficient QA will be reduce to 1.98 x 10−4, That result 
is generated from calculation within frequency and protection 
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layers given. After that the result will be ploted on Risk 
Matrix again as shown below. 
 
The result shown risk level which is on High risk criteria can 
be reduce to medium criteria after use mitigation with LOPA 
method. 
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Causes of Change in design  
A1: Failure on Re-hooking  
A2: Design fault 
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Causes of Any rust or corrosion 
A1: The  insufficient maintenance of lifeboats 
A2: Equipment failure 
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Causes of Any rust or corrosion 
A1: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
A2: Equipment failure 
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Causes of The insufficient maintenance of lifeboats 
A1: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
A2: Equipment failure 
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Causes of The lack of familiarity with lifeboats and the 
associated equipment 
A1: Training 
A2: Physical condition 
A3: Communications / training 
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Causes of The lack of familiarity with lifeboats and the 
associated equipment 
A1: Training 
A2: Physical condition 
A3: Communications / training 
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Causes of  Equipment failure 
A1: Any rust or corrosion 
A2: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
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Causes of  Equipment failure 
A1: Any rust or corrosion 
A2: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
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Causes of  Equipment failure 
A1: Any rust or corrosion 
A2: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
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Causes of  Hydraulic oil lever below markings 
A1: Communications / training 
A2: Uncontrolled descent 
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Causes of  Hydraulic oil lever below markings 
A1: Communications / training 
A2: Uncontrolled descent 
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Causes of  Equipment failure 
A1: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
A2: Any rust or corrosion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
 
Causes of  Equipment failure 
A1: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
A2: Any rust or corrosion 
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Causes of  Equipment failure 
A1: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
A2: Any rust or corrosion 
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Causes of  Equipment failure 
A1: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of release 
mechanism 
A2: Any rust or corrosion 
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Causes of  Insufficient Quality Assurance (QA) during 
production process 
A1: Incorrect design 
A2: Human error 
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Causes of  Impairment and decomposition of gelcoat 
A1: Incorrect design 
A2: Human error 
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Causes of  Poorly designed bow geometry 
A1: Incorrect design 
A2: Human error 
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Causes of  Interference with other free fall lifeboats during or 
after the lunch 
A1: Underlying causes 
A2: Communications / training 
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Causes of  Leaking of gas below water surface reduces 
effective water density and hence buoyancy of lifeboat 
A1: Incorrect design 
A2: Human error 
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Causes of  Burning oil on sea surface 
A1: Insufficient water spray (fire resistance) system 
A2: Fails to leave area 
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Causes of Skew landing due to erroneous understanding of 
environmental loads 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Human error 
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Causes of  Ice on the water 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Human error 
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Causes of  Excessive rolling leading to air intake in 
submerged position 
A1: Abnormality breather valve functions 
A2: Any obstacle exists in the breather valve 
A3: Any rust and foreign matter 
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Causes of  Dynamic motion on skid or davit 
A1: Any rust or corrosion on skid or davit 
A2: Overload capacity during launch  
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Causes of  Dynamic motion on skid or davit 
A1: Any rust or corrosion on skid or davit 
A2: Overload capacity during launch  
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Causes of  Dynamic motion on skid or davit 
A1: Any rust or corrosion on skid or davit 
A2: Overload capacity during launch  
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Causes of  Dirt or contamination on skid. Broken friction 
pads. Angle during damaged condition. 
A1: Any obstacle exists in the boat fall path 
A2: Less of lubrication  
A3: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of rails  
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Causes of  Dirt or contamination on skid. Broken friction 
pads. Angle during damaged condition. 
A1: Any obstacle exists in the boat fall path 
A2: Less of lubrication  
A3: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of rails  
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Causes of  Failure on slide track. 
A1: Any obstacle exists in the boat fall path 
A2: Less of lubrication  
A3: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of rails  
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Causes of  Failure on slide track. 
A1: Any obstacle exists in the boat fall path 
A2: Less of lubrication  
A3: Inadequate or ineffective maintenance of rails  
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Causes of  Maximum pressure 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Operator decision to embarkation.  
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Causes of  Rough sea 
A1: Bad weather conditions  
A2: Operator decision to embarkation.  
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Causes of  Windshield covered by oil or salt 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Uncontrolled descent  
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Causes of  Dew 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Different temperature between outside and inside 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
Causes of  Hydrodynamic pressure 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Wave damages craft 
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Causes of  Open hatch 
A1: Any leakage on water shield 
A2: Any damaged on doors and hatches 
A3: Lack of lifting device 
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Causes of  Open hatch 
A1: Any leakage on water shield 
A2: Any damaged on doors and hatches 
A3: Lack of lifting device 
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Causes of  Any hazardous rust 
A1: Any leakage on water shield 
A2: Any damaged on doors and hatches 
A3: Lack of lifting device 
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Causes of  Open hatch 
A1: Any leakage on water shield 
A2: Any damaged on doors and hatches 
A3: Lack of lifting device 
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Causes of  Missing requirements 
A1: Incorrect design 
A2: Malfunctions 
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Causes of  Pilot seat design 
A1: Incorrect design 
A2: Malfunctions 
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Causes of  Improper/missing requirements 
A1: Incorrect design 
A2: Not follow the instructions 
A3: On bad condition of seat belt 
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Causes of  Improper/missing requirements 
A1: Incorrect design 
A2: Not follow the instructions 
A3: On bad condition of seat belt 
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Causes of  Unsafe practices during lifeboat inspections and 
drills 
A1: Not follow the instructions 
A2: Uncontrolled panic, panic attack by passenger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Causes of  Jerk in wire because of dynamic affects 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Overload of lifting arrangement 
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Causes of  Climbing on top of  lifeboat while connecting 
lifting hook 
A1: Bad weather conditions 
A2: Training 
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Causes of  Loss of power 
A1: Higher voltage inlet 
A2: Lower voltage inlet 
A3 : Loss of power 
B1 : Overheating  
B2 : Structural deficiency 
B3 : Overheating 
B4 : Structural deficiency 
B5 : Fail to start on demand 
B6 : Breakdown 
B7 : Overheating 
B8 : Parameter deviation 
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Causes of  Error judgement 
A1: Error visual measuring 
A2: Error calibration 
B1 : Abnormal instrument reading 
B2 : Parameter deviation 
B3 : Structural deficiency 
B4 : Vibration 
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Causes of  Hydraulic power pack system can’t work 
A1: Loss of  power 
A2: Internal leakage on hydraulic motor 
A3 : Short circuit 
B1 : Fail to start on demand 
B2 : Breakdown 
B3 : Overheating 
B4 : Parameter deviation 
B5 : Structural deficiency 
B6 : Fail to start on demand 
B7 : High voltage inlet 
B8 : low voltage inlet  
C1 : Overheating 
C2 : Structural deficiency 
C3 : Overheating 
C4 : Structural deficiency 
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Causes of  Stuck on panel 
A1: Failure on panel 
A2: Fail to control valve 
B1 : Vibration 
B2 : Structural deficiency 
B3 : Structural deficiency 
B4 : Parameter deviation 
B5 : External leakage 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
 
Causes of  Launching while the skid is tilting sideways 
A1: Overload of the skid 
A2: Doesn’t follow the instruction 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Depend on the result of risk assessment for free fall lifeboat 
launching concluded that : 
1. There is so many risk can happen on the process of 
launching and retrieval. But that can be reduced with 
mitigation for decrease the frequency or give a prevention. 
 
2. Human error proved to be a significant contributory factor 
in many of the reported lifeboat incidents, as it is in most 
accidents. Lack of supervision was not found to be a 
significant factor in the cause of reported human error 
related incidents therefore the potential for mistakes might 
reasonably be expected to increase during the stress of a 
real emergency situation. 
 
3. The design and construction of lifeboats and in particular 
auxiliary equipment, such as brakes and release gear, play 
a significant part in contributing towards the cause of 
many lifeboat incidents with the most catastrophic event 
being the opening of a boat hook with the boat some 
distance from the water, Incidents of this nature can be 
avoided if the boat crew is able to confirm the hook is 
secure for lowering or lifting. Their repeated failure has, 
however, played a large role in reducing ship staff 
confidence in lifeboats. 
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4. SOLAS requirements for lifeboats are focused on 
launching. Although regular training is required, 
insufficient emphasis is placed on measures designed to 
ensure that routine operations, such as recovery and lifting 
of lifeboats can be conducted safely. 
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